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I. INTRODUCTION
In the modern world, digital data is everywhere. The average person generates a huge data footprint thanks to technological advancements such as
cloud storage and increased connectedness of devices. Each day yields approximately 3.5 billion Google searches and 1.5 billion people active on Facebook, and every minute there are 156 million emails sent, 4.1 million new
YouTube video views, 45,000 Uber trips, and 16 million text messages received.1
This massive data stockpile presents opportunities to improve business efficiency, aid in criminal investigations, and even create new job markets.2
However, it’s also a logistical nightmare. The sheer volume of data presents
organizational and analytical challenges.3 Beyond the administrative problems, there are also privacy concerns and accessibility issues.4
These privacy and accessibility concerns are even more severe in the context of criminal investigations.5 Because of digital data’s prevalence in modern society, that type of information is sometimes used as evidence of criminal
activity.6 But there remain questions on how much of a person’s digital footprint should be accessible when that person’s civil liberties are on the line.7
The issue is further complicated when data flows between multiple foreign
states and the data must be shared across international borders.
Cross-border data sharing is a major hurdle to data accessibility, especially
in the context of data sharing as part of criminal investigations. International
entities must cooperate for effective data sharing because digital data moves

1

Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing Stats
Everyone Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018, 12:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-stats
-everyone-should-read/#642381fb60ba.
2
See Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data: The Management Revolution,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/10/big-data-the-management-revolutio
n; See also Sean E. Goodison, Robert C. Davis, & Brian A. Jackson, Digital Evidence and
the U.S. Criminal Justice System: Identifying Technology and Other Needs to More Effectively Acquire and Utilize Digital Evidence, RAND CORP. (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/p
dffiles1/nij/grants/248770.pdf.
3
B. R. Prakash & M. Hanumanthappa, Issues and Challenges in the Era of Big Data
Mining, 3 INTL. J. EMERGING TRENDS & TECH. COMPUTER SCI. 321 (2014).
4
Id.; see also Top 12 Common Problems in Data Mining, BIG DATA MADE SIMPLE
(Feb. 3, 2015), http://bigdata-madesimple.com/12-common-problems-in-data-mining/.
5
Brian A. Jackson, Using Digital Data in Criminal Investigations: Where and How to
Draw the Line?, FORENSIC MAG. (May 11, 2017), https://www.forensicmag.com/news/201
7/05/using-digital-data-criminal-investigations-where-and-how-draw-line.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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freely outside of international boundaries.8 Consider an email sent from Atlanta, Georgia to Seattle, Washington. That email might take a direct route
across the United States, but it is also possible the email could bounce through
a Canadian server before reaching its final destination.9 Cloud storage further
erodes data’s respect for international borders because stored data could be
held in storage centers located across the globe in nations such as India, Ireland, or Chile.10
Various agreements and pieces of legislation have attempted to facilitate
cross-border data sharing. The most recent law addressing this issue is the
Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, which is a United
States law enacted in March 2018.11 The CLOUD Act is aimed at assisting
criminal investigations by allowing law enforcement to collect data stored in
foreign states.12 The CLOUD Act achieves this purpose through two main
functions.
First, the CLOUD Act forces U.S. companies to comply with domestic
warrants and turn over digital data, regardless of whether the data is “physically” stored in the United States or on foreign soil.13 As an illustration of this
function, imagine an Irish citizen who allegedly commits a crime against the
United States. Law enforcement wants to obtain emails held on a Microsoft
account, but “physically” located on a server in Ireland, as part of their investigation. The CLOUD Act allows law enforcement to obtain this data via a
U.S. warrant, without consideration of Irish law.14
The CLOUD Act’s second function gives the executive branch of the
United States power to enter into data sharing executive agreements with foreign governments.15 For example, the United States could have a data sharing
executive agreement with Australia. If the Australian government requested
data held by Microsoft, or any other U.S. technology company, the United
States would be inclined to turn over the data with no additional process.16
8
Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The Evolving Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 473, 475 (2016).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Zarine Kharazian, The CLOUD Act: Arguments for and Against, INT’L ENF’T L. REP.
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://ielrblog.com/index.php/2018/04/10/the-cloud-act-arguments-for-a
nd-against/.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
This hypothetical situation mirrors the facts of United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138
S. Ct. 356 (2017) (mem.) (granting government’s petition for certiorari), which is the Supreme Court case that the CLOUD Act was written to address. The CLOUD Act rendered
United States v. Microsoft Corp. moot.
15
Kharazian, supra note 11.
16
There are several caveats that could affect this situation. These caveats, and the executive agreement provision in general, will be discussed further in subsequent sections of
this Note.
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This Note presents a comprehensive look at cross-border data sharing,
placing special emphasis on the CLOUD Act. It briefly recounts the history
of U.S. legislation governing cross-border data accessibility in criminal investigations, while illustrating that modern advancements in law enforcement
techniques and data management systems created a need for liberalized crossborder data sharing. This Note will explain how the CLOUD Act fulfills that
need by streamlining the cumbersome process previously used to request extraterritorially stored data. This Note will further discuss both domestic and
international reaction to the CLOUD Act. It will suggest that reaction within
the United States was mostly positive, but the foreign response was mixed and
exuded nervousness about the Act’s potential impacts (especially regarding
the executive agreements provision). Finally, this Note will provide recommended amendments to the executive agreements provision. The suggested
amendments are aimed at maintaining positive foreign relations and protecting personal privacy interests in the wake of heightened cross-border data accessibility. This Note recommends modifications to the CLOUD Act executive data sharing agreements, including mandated compliance reviews every
year instead of every five years, required congressional approval of each executive agreement, elimination of the reciprocal data sharing requirement, and
adding a notice requirement.
II. CROSS-BORDER DATA SHARING
Section II of this note will provide a brief history of cross-border data sharing. It will explore the various pieces of legislation used to facilitate international flow of data, while highlighting the reasons cross-border data sharing
is necessary and the problems associated with transferring data this way. This
Section will demonstrate the inconsistencies between modern technology and
prior legislation governing cross-border data access; it will show why the
CLOUD Act was necessary.
In the 1980s, electronic communication became a main staple of society.
New inventions such as personal computers, cellular phones, fax machines,
and pagers ushered in a digital revolution and a new era of digital data.17 Congress, concerned that the Fourth Amendment alone would not adequately protect electronic communication, passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986.18 Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
called the Stored Communications Act (SCA), was intended to protect digital
17
See Gil Press, A Very Short History of Big Data, FORBES (May 9, 2013), https://www.f
orbes.com/sites/gilpress/2013/05/09/a-very-short-history-of-big-data/#487eedaf65a1.
18
Stored Wire and Electronics Communications and Transactional Record Access
(Stored Communications Act), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); Simon M. Baker, Unfriending the Stored Communications Act: How Technological Advancement and Legislative Inaction Have Rendered Its
Protections Obsolete, 22 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 81 (2011).
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communications from unreasonable government interference through “a set
of Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections.”19
The SCA’s privacy protections were codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702 and
2703. Section 2702 described the rules for whether or not a service provider
could voluntarily disclose information to the government,20 while Section
2703 detailed the procedure the government had to follow when compelling a
provider to disclose information.21
However, the SCA also contained ambiguities and potential data accessibility problems. For example, the SCA expressly prohibited U.S. companies
from turning over digital data to foreign law enforcement.22 Because of this
provision, foreign states conducting local investigations that needed data
stored within their boundaries would still have to go through the U.S. government to access that data.23 This system unnecessarily hindered foreign criminal investigations, and the United States was burdened with a large amount of
requests for data.24
It was also not clear whether the SCA prohibited U.S. companies from
providing the U.S. government with data that was physically stored in foreign
nations—i.e., whether the SCA applied extraterritorially.25 The SCA’s application to data stored on foreign soil was the pinnacle issue in the once-anticipated U.S. Supreme Court case Microsoft Corp. v. United States; however,
the CLOUD Act eliminated the need for judicial intervention by overriding
this provision of the SCA.26 The CLOUD Act’s intervention will be discussed
with further detail in Section III of this Note.
Many critics viewed the SCA as an obstacle to cross-border data sharing
in criminal investigations.27 Modern criminal investigations often require obtaining digital evidence stored in other countries because the data is frequently
held by U.S. technology companies, which have complex global data management systems.28 For example, Microsoft stores data based on proximity to
19
Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1212 (2004).
20
18 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (1986).
21
18 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (1986).
22
18 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (1986); Chris Cook, Cross-Border Data Access and Active Cyber
Defense: Assessing Legislative Options for A New International Cybersecurity Rulebook,
29 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 205, 222 (2018).
23
Cook, supra note 22, at 223, 225 (under the old way, foreign states would have to
petition the U.S. government, which would then require a U.S. judge to approve the transfer
of data based on a finding of the U.S. standard of probable cause).
24
Id.
25
Id. at 223.
26
David Katzmaier, Supreme Court Rules Microsoft Privacy Dispute Moot, CNET
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/supreme-court-rules-microsoft-privacy-disp
ute-moot/.
27
Cook, supra note 22, at 222.
28
Id. at 222–23.
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where the customer says he or she is physically located; Google segments and
stores data by type on different servers around the world.29
When the SCA was created in 1986, almost all digital data was stored domestically, and the United States had undeniable jurisdiction over that data.
However, the advent of cloud storage compounded the complexity of data
management in a way the drafters of the SCA never comprehended.30
The method for states to obtain international cooperation in criminal investigations under the SCA regime was through use of mutual legal assistance
treaties (MLATs).31 These treaties are bilateral cooperation agreements between nations.32 MLATs assist not only in data sharing, but also apply the
laws of the nation where the data is stored.33 As an example, if a member of
the European Union (EU) requested U.S. data by way of an MLAT, the United
States would be responsible for the investigation that procured the data, and
that investigation would have to comply with U.S. constitutional requirements, including the Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment.34
The United States currently has an MLAT with every EU member state
and many other countries across the world.35 The United States entered into
the multiparty MLAT with the EU in 2010, and the agreement had a specific
provision dealing with data sharing in criminal investigations.36
While it may seem that MLATs are a step forward in terms of cross-border
data sharing, the MLAT process is often criticized as being time-consuming
and frustrating.37 The process for foreign governments to receive data stored
29

Id.; Sean Gallagher, The Great Disk Drive in the Sky: How Web Giants Store Big-and
We Mean Big-Data, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 26, 2012), https://arstechnica.com/information-t
echnology/2012/01/the-big-disk-drive-in-the-sky-how-the-giants-of-the-web-store-big-da
ta.
30
Cook, supra note 22, at 223.
31
T. MARKUS FUNK, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES AND LETTERS ROGATORY: A
GUIDE FOR JUDGES 8 (2014).
32
Id. at 4.
33
Id. at 6–7.
34
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing freedom from “unreasonable searches and seizures”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (witnesses deposed in the United States or in a foreign
country retain the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, regardless of
whether they are U.S. citizens or foreign nationals). See generally, In re Terrorist Bombings, U.S. Embassies, E. Africa, 552 F.3d 177, 199 (2nd Cir. 2008) (“[I]t does not matter
whether the defendant is a U.S. citizen or a foreign national: ‘no person’ tried in the civilian
courts of the United States can be compelled ‘to be a witness against himself.’”).
35
FUNK, supra note 31, at 6.
36
Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, art. 5 U.S.-EU, June 25, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 10201.1 (“The Contracting Parties shall . . . take such measures as may be necessary to enable
joint investigative teams to be established and operated in the respective territories of the
United States of America and each Member State for the purpose of facilitating criminal
investigations or prosecution . . . .”).
37
THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/defa
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in the United States requires the foreign state to submit a request through the
Department of Justice Office of International Affairs, which ultimately requires a U.S. Judge to approve the request based on his or her finding of the
U.S. standard of probable cause.38 According to a study conducted by President Obama’s Review Group in Intelligence and Communications Technologies, these requests take an average of ten months to complete.39
A ten-month delay is not conducive to criminal investigations, especially
when digital data is involved. It is essential for law enforcement to move
quickly in collecting digital data because there is potential for the data to be
easily altered or destroyed by simple actions.40 As a result of the frustrating
delay caused by relying on MLATs, some foreign states experimented with
their own solutions of collecting digital data.41 These methods included expanding surveillance, mandating data localization, and limiting encryption.42
Many of the methods go against U.S. interests, such as maintaining an open
internet.43
The United States also struggled with conducting criminal investigations
under the SCA. There was a question of whether domestic warrants, issued
under the authority of the SCA, applied to data that was physically stored on
servers located in foreign countries.44 The Second Circuit held that data physically stored outside U.S. borders was beyond the scope of a domestic warrant’s authority under the SCA.45 Concerned that the Second Circuit’s decision would exacerbate the already massive delay in digital evidence
collection, the government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, and
certiorari was granted in United States v. Microsoft Corp.46 Thus, the stage
was set for the Supreme Court to decide a key issue of data accessibility in the
modern world; however, Congress took preemptive action and hurriedly resolved this issue by passing the CLOUD Act.

ult/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf.
38
Tiffany Lin & Mailyn Fidler, Cross-Border Data Access Reform: A Primer on the
Proposed U.S.-U.K. Agreement, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARV.
U. (Sept. 13, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3035563.
39
THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS, supra note 37,
at 227.
40
Goodison et al., supra note 2, at 7.
41
Lin & Fidler, supra note 38, at 4.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Cook, supra note 22, at 222.
45
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. U.S. v. Microsoft
Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017), and vacated and remanded sub nom. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp.,
138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
46
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (mem.) (granting government’s petition for certiorari).
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III. THE CLARIFYING LAWFUL OVERSEAS USE OF DATA (CLOUD) ACT
Section III of this note will provide a description of the CLOUD Act and
its two main functions: applying SCA warrants extraterritorially and allowing
the executive branch to enter international data sharing agreements. The description of the Act found in this Section includes the circumstances surrounding its enactment, as well as an explanation of the key provisions and requirements imposed by the Act.
Congress enacted the CLOUD Act to modify the SCA and provide legislative guidance on domestic warrant application to data physically stored on
foreign servers.47 When the CLOUD Act was passed, it was incorporated as
part of the 2018 Omnibus Spending Bill,48 which is a 2,232-page document
that authorized $1.3 trillion of government spending in 2018.49 Since the Act
was part of a larger bill, it did not receive its own standalone floor vote in
either the House or Senate.50 It also never received a hearing and was never
reviewed by a committee.51
Immediately following the CLOUD Act’s adoption, both the Department
of Justice and Microsoft filed motions to dismiss Microsoft Corp. v. United
States, arguing the new law rendered the issue of the case moot.52 The Supreme Court agreed and released an unsigned opinion that dismissed the
case.53
The CLOUD Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2713. It adds a provision to the
SCA and states:
A provider of electronic communication service or remote
computing service shall comply with the obligations of this
chapter to preserve, backup, or disclose the contents of a wire
47

Cook, supra note 22, at 226–27.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. § 102 (2018).
49
Iain Thomson, US Congress Quietly Slips Cloud-Spying Powers into Page 2,201 of
Spending Mega-Bill, REGISTER (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/03/23
/cloud_act_spending_bill/.
50
David Ruiz, Responsibility Deflected, the CLOUD Act Passes, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/responsibility-deflectedcloud-act-passes.
51
Id.; Burying the CLOUD Act inside a massive spending bill was criticized by some
as a means to push through the legislation without adequate consideration of its merits and
the public’s concerns; however, analyzing the means by which the Act was passed is outside the scope of this Note.
52
Monica Nickelsburg, Microsoft and DOJ Ask Supreme Court to Dismiss Case Involving Customer’s Overseas Data, GEEKWIRE (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.geekwire.com/201
8/microsoft-doj-ask-supreme-court-dismiss-case-involving-customers-overseas-data/.
53
David Katzmaier, Supreme Court Rules Microsoft Privacy Dispute Moot, CNET
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/supreme-court-rules-microsoft-privacy-disp
ute-moot/.
48
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or electronic communication and any record or other information pertaining to a customer or subscriber within such provider’s possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether
such communication, record, or other information is located
within or outside of the United States.54
The language of the act unequivocally says that warrants issued through
the SCA apply to all data under the provider’s “possession, custody, or control”—regardless of whether the data is physically stored within the United
States or outside its borders.55 This is an effort to facilitate domestic criminal
investigation by providing improved accessibility to digital data stored in international territory.56
Domestic criminal investigations are streamlined by this provision because
MLATs are no longer relied upon for collecting digital evidence. An SCA
warrant is now, in effect, a one-stop shop to procure all digital data held by a
U.S. technology company.
Nevertheless, U.S. technology companies are given an opportunity to challenge SCA warrants through the CLOUD Act.57 The provider may file a motion to quash a warrant if the provider reasonably believes both (1) “that the
customer or subscriber is not a United States person and does not reside in the
United States” and (2) “that the required disclosure would create a material
risk that the provider would violate the laws of a qualifying foreign government.”58
The Act goes on to define the standards by which a court should evaluate
motions to quash SCA warrants. A court may only quash a warrant if it finds
that
(1) turning over the data would cause the provider to violate a
foreign government’s laws; (2) based on the totality of the circumstances, the interests of justice dictate that the legal process should be modified or quashed; and (3) the customer . . .
is not a United States person and does not reside in the United
States.59
Even though the CLOUD Act provides a mechanism for U.S. technology
companies to challenge SCA warrants pre-enforcement, there are no similar

54
55
56
57
58
59

18 U.S.C.A. § 2713 (2018).
Id.
Kharazian, supra note 11.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(h)(2) (2019).
18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(h)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(h)(2)(A)–(B).
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measures that allow subscribers or customers to challenge SCA warrants preenforcement.60
The CLOUD Act streamlines domestic data accessibility, but it also addresses foreign states’ access to U.S.-held data.61 More specifically, the Act
allows the U.S. executive branch to enter into data sharing executive agreements with qualifying foreign states, thus providing a means for select foreign
governments to sidestep the cumbersome MLAT process.62
However, there are substantive and procedural requirements of these executive agreements.63 Foreign states may only enter into a data sharing executive agreement after both the U.S. Attorney General and Secretary of State
certify in writing with an accompanying explanation that the foreign state “affords robust substantive and procedural protections for privacy and civil liberties.”64 The foreign state must also agree to give the United States reciprocal
access to data held by the foreign state.65 Further, the executive branch must
review and renew each executive agreement every five years to ensure these
requirements continue to be adequately fulfilled.66
Each individual request for data issued by a foreign state under an executive agreement must meet additional requirements. The requests must be sufficiently specific (i.e., target a distinct person, account, device, or other identifier), have basis in “articulable and credible facts,” be subject to review by
an independent authority in the foreign state, and cannot be used to infringe
free speech.67
However, evaluation of whether the statutory requirements of these agreements are met is a job delegated almost exclusively to the executive branch.
The CLOUD Act expressly eliminates judicial review as a means of evaluating these executive agreements: “[a] determination or certification made by
the Attorney General . . . shall not be subject to judicial or administrative review.”68 In fact, the only means of challenging the executive branch’s decision
to enter into a data sharing executive agreement is a joint resolution of disapproval passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate within 180

60
Jonathan I. Blackman, Jared Gerber, Nowell D. Bamberger, Georgia V. Stasinopoulos
& Nicholas G. Amin, CLOUD Act Establishes Framework to Access Overseas Stored Electronic Communications, 30 No. 6 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10, 13 (2018).
61
Kharazian, supra note 11.
62
18 U.S.C.A. § 2523 (2018).
63
Id.; Jennifer Daskal, Microsoft Ireland, the Cloud Act, and International Lawmaking
2.0, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 13 (2018).
64
18 U.S.C.A. § 2523(b)(1) (2018).
65
18 U.S.C.A. § 2523(b)(4)(I) (2018).
66
18 U.S.C.A. § 2523(e) (2018).
67
18 U.S.C.A. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(iv) (2018); Daskal, supra note 63, at 14.
68
18 U.S.C.A. § 2523(c).
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days of the Attorney General providing Congress with notice of the executive
agreement.69
Another important feature of the CLOUD Act provides that these executive agreements do not allow foreign states to access the data of U.S. citizens;
the agreements may only be used to collect data of foreign persons located
outside of the United States.70 Foreign states who wish to access data of individuals in the United States (including citizens, legal permanent residents, and
others located within the physical borders of the United States) must employ
the MLAT process.71
IV. DOMESTIC REACTION TO THE CLOUD ACT
This Section discusses the reaction to the CLOUD Act among entities
within U.S. borders. It analyzes how U.S. government officials, U.S. technology companies, legal academics, and domestic civil liberties organizations responded to the Act being passed.
While the CLOUD Act was being considered, and when ultimately passed,
it was met with a mixed domestic reaction. The U.S. government, many U.S.
technology companies, and some legal academics voiced strong support for
the Act; advocates view it as necessary for modern criminal investigations and
an important answer to previously ambiguous questions regarding cross-border data accessibility.72 On the other hand, civil liberties groups and privacy
advocates saw the Act as a violation of basic human rights because it offers
inadequate freedom of speech and privacy protections for activists operating
in foreign states.73
The CLOUD Act gained bipartisan support from members of Congress
due to its ability to facilitate law enforcement while providing clarity in regard

69

18 U.S.C.A. § 2523(d)(4)(B).
Daskal, supra note 63, at 14.
71
Id.
72
Support for the CLOUD Act of 2018, MICROSOFT (Apr. 11, 2018), https://blogs.micros
oft.com/uploads/prod/sites/5/2018/04/Support-for-the-CLOUD-Act-of-2018_4.11.18.pdf.
73
Joint letter from Access Now, Advocacy for Principled Action in Gov’t, American
Civil Liberties Union, Amnesty Int’l USA, Asian American Legal Def. and Educ. Fund
(AALDEF), Campaign for Liberty Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., Ctr.Link: The Cmty. of
LGBT Ctrs., Constitutional Alliance, Def. Rights & Dissent, Demand Progress Action,
Elec. Frontier Found., Equal. Cal., Free Press Action Fund, Gov’t Accountability Project,
Gov’t Info. Watch, Human Rights Watch, Liberty Coalition, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def.
Lawyers, Nat’l Black Justice Coal., New America’s Open Tech. Inst., OpenMedia, People
for the American Way & Restore The Fourth, to U.S. Congress (Mar. 12, 2018) available
at https://www.aclu.org/letter/coalition-letter-cloud-act [hereinafter Letter from Access
Now et al.]. Human rights criticisms are discussed with further detail in Section IV of this
Note.
70
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to cross-border data accessibility.74 It was widely praised among domestic
legislators as a much needed update to the antiquities and ambiguities of the
SCA.75
Most of the major U.S. technology companies (such as Apple, Facebook,
Google, Microsoft, and Oath) also voiced support for the CLOUD Act.76 The
above listed companies authored a joint letter that praised the Act as “allow[ing] law enforcement to investigate cross-border crime and terrorism in a
way that avoids international legal conflicts.”77 They further suggested that
the Act is a necessary means to ensure legal protection for both consumers
and data holders in the modern world.78
The Act may also be a means for the United States to ensure responsible
use of data by foreign states. Some legal academics argue that the periodic
compliance review requirement under the CLOUD Act presents a good opportunity to monitor how foreign states are using data and to police potential
abuses.79
On the other hand, some see the five-year term between periodic compliance reviews as a detriment that threatens human rights.80 In an essay written
by members of the ACLU and Amnesty International, critics sharply rebuked
the data sharing executive agreement provision of the CLOUD Act as offering
inadequate protection: “the idea that countries can effectively be safe-listed as
human-rights compliant, such that their individual data requests need no further human rights vetting—is wrong.”81 Civil rights groups maintain that the
current structure of the CLOUD Act puts international human rights activists
in danger. They argue that there are no safeguards in situations where a foreign state experiences “rapid deterioration in human rights,” such as Turkey
in mid-2016 after an attempted coup.82

74

Sen. Orrin Hatch, The CLOUD Act: It’s Time for Our Laws to Catch up with Our
Technology, MEDIUM (Feb. 26, 2018), https://medium.com/@SenOrrinHatch/the-cloud-ac
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Critics also take issue with the level of discretion the Act gives to the executive branch and the vagueness of the standards used to evaluate individual
data requests.83 It is possible that foreign states with good overall human rights
protections could abuse the executive agreements on an individual level. For
example, Poland is a country with strong political rights and civil liberties
protections; therefore, Poland would most likely be able to enter a data sharing
executive agreement under the CLOUD Act.84 But, in 2017, Poland engaged
in an abuse of data collection by raiding the offices of several women’s rights
groups and confiscating hard drives containing sensitive personal data.85 The
CLOUD Act could theoretically be used in a similar capacity—to seize data
and stunt the progress of activists and other political opponents.86
Proponents of the CLOUD Act counter that it is a step forward in protecting civil liberties because it disincentivizes foreign states from turning to local
legislation to avoid the MLAT process.87 As foreign states became frustrated
with the cumbersome MLAT process, they faced pressure to pass laws that
mandated data localization, such as requiring all citizens’ digital data to be
stored within that country’s borders.88 Mandated data localization means all
information would be available to foreign governments under local laws. In
many countries, that could lead to police access to data “without any judicial
process.”89
Alternatively, foreign states could rely on invasive data collection techniques to get around MLATs, such as expanding surveillance and limiting use
of encryption.90 None of these options are desirable outcomes from a privacy
and civil liberties perspective.91 They infringe upon individual privacy rights
and are contrary to the goal of an open internet.92
V. FOREIGN REACTION TO THE CLOUD ACT
Section V of this Note illustrates foreign response to the CLOUD Act. This
Section looks at the governments of various foreign states, as well as international human rights organizations, to provide a complete picture of the impact
passing the CLOUD Act had on the international community. It also provides
83
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analysis and suggests reasons why foreign governments may have reacted
similarly. This Section further explores potential conflicts of laws and other
foreign regulations that may be oppositional to the Act.
The Australian government wholly supports the CLOUD Act. Australia
released a statement after the law was passed, which complimented the Act’s
ability to improve law enforcement efficiency while protecting personal
data.93 However, Australia’s positive reaction is not consistent with the overall foreign response to this legislation. The general foreign reaction is better
characterized as one of uncertainty and unease, especially among the United
Kingdom (UK) and other EU member states.94
Concerns about the rushed nature of the CLOUD Act and the Act’s lack
of compatibility with the EU’s newly passed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) led to a foreign backlash against the Act.95 EU justice commissioner Vera Jourova described the Act’s adoption as a “fast-track procedure, which narrows the room for the potential compatible solution between
the EU and the U.S.”96 Another European critic described the CLOUD Act as
an “unstoppable weapon” that would allow the United States “to dominate the
world” and further argued that data held by U.S. technology companies can
no longer be considered secure.97
Adoption of the CLOUD Act came at a time when the EU was working
toward more robust personal privacy protections of digital data. Two months
after the CLOUD Act was signed into law, the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), a sweeping privacy regulation, was enacted.98 The
GDPR is a binding piece of legislation that is enforceable in all EU member
states.99 Among other privacy regulations, the GDPR gives citizens in the EU
control over their personal data and establishes a right for citizens to demand
their personal data be deleted, even if that data is stored in a different country.100 Another important provision of the GDPR prevents transferring
93
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personal data to a foreign state in any manner which is otherwise inconsistent
with the GDPR.101 Any potential conflict between restricted data sharing under the GDPR and the CLOUD Act’s reciprocal requirement is further explored in Section VI of this Note.
Likewise, China also has local data sharing regulations that could conflict
with the CLOUD Act. The recently enacted Cyber Security Law (CSL) requires sensitive data (e.g., information on Chinese citizens or relating to national security) to be stored domestically on Chinese servers.102 The law also
prohibits Chinese companies from transferring sensitive data to authorities
abroad without undergoing clearance from the Chinese government first.103
China is not the only foreign state requiring data localization; India recently issued a directive mandating that all data related to financial transactions conducted in India must be stored on local Indian servers.104 Further, the
Indian Parliament is also considering a bill that would require all data collected, shared, or processed in India to be physically stored within India’s borders.105
The National Assembly of Vietnam recently passed a similar law.106 This
new Vietnamese legislation, which is entitled the Law on Cybersecurity No.
24/2018/QH14 (Cybersecurity Law) and took effect January 1, 2019,i requires
data localization within the territory of Vietnam.107 The data localization mandate applies to foreign and domestic enterprises that provide services via the
internet in Vietnam and are involved in collection, analysis, and processing of
personal data; and data generated by users in Vietnam.108109
Data localization mandates are rationalized based on a fear of unwarranted
foreign surveillance and a need to bolster law enforcement by local
101
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agencies.110 However, these laws do more harm than good in terms of both
privacy rights and data security.111 Data localization does nothing to curtail
foreign surveillance—due to sophisticated data surveillance techniques, physical access is not necessary for international spies to conduct surveillance.112
Also, data security experts argue these international wrongdoers “are not deterred by new laws; keeping data within a border won’t stop those who believe
that rules don’t apply to them.”113
Data localization does, however, open the door to privacy abuses from local entities.114 It also creates a vulnerability to natural disasters destroying all
copies of data,115 increases cost of data storage,116 and negatively impacts international trade.117 Additionally, mandated data localization is contrary to the
idea of a free internet, which is a value traditionally championed by the United
States.118 It instead leads to a “balkanization” of the internet, fragmenting a
once cohesive entity into many separate and distinct versions of the internet
spread out across the globe.119
Advocates of the CLOUD Act argue that the executive data sharing agreements hold down on mandated data localization; because foreign states could
rely on an efficient way to get U.S.-held data, the theory was those states
would be more open to allowing their citizens’ data to be stored via U.S. companies and extraterritorial servers.120 However, that desired result was not
achieved. The previously discussed data localization efforts in China, India,
and Vietnam indicate the CLOUD Act was not successful in deterring recent
pushes toward localization.121 In fact, these Asian countries appear to be doubling down on localization efforts in the wake of the CLOUD Act. Data
110
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localization mandates show that, even under the CLOUD Act’s regime, foreign states are hesitant to allow free access by the United States to their local
data.
Much like many foreign governments, international human rights organizations are also made uneasy by the CLOUD Act’s potential to spread personal data across borders.122 There are no major international human rights
groups that support the Act.123 Amnesty International’s U.S. director Naureen
Shah expressed “grave misgivings” for the CLOUD Act, stating that it “jeopardizes the lives and safety of thousands of human rights defenders.”124 Similarly, Human Rights Watch, which is a nonprofit organization that investigates and reports on human rights abuses across the globe, argues the new
international data sharing process under the Act gutted prior human rights
protections.125
The main issues that human rights advocates have with the CLOUD Act
are directed at the executive agreements section; more specifically, the fiveyear window between U.S. compliance reviews and the concentration of
power solely in the executive branch are causes for concern.126 The lengthy
amount of time between U.S. evaluations of a foreign state’s privacy and human rights protections could allow a once-compliant nation to rapidly deteriorate and abuse data collection for an extended period between compliance
reviews.127 Some critics also argue that there is risk the U.S. government will
enter into these executive agreements for political reasons, even if the foreign
state is known to abuse privacy rights.128 That risk is further exacerbated by
the lack of congressional input into the validity of the executive agreements.129
VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CLOUD ACT
The remaining portion of this Note focuses on proposed amendments to
the CLOUD Act’s executive agreements provision. The intent is to provide
legislators with suggestions of how to adjust the law in order to better foster
positive international relations, further encourage foreign states to participate
122
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in these agreements, and provide more stringent protections for international
human rights.
The proposed amendments are suggestions to improve the CLOUD Act;
however, this Note does not take the position that the Act is a harmful piece
of legislation. On the contrary, this Note argues the Act represents positive
change. The CLOUD Act is necessary for effective law enforcement in the
modern world. Though digital forensics and collection of digital evidence are
relatively new concepts for law enforcement, investigators rely heavily on
digital data in modern criminal investigations.130 Because data management
systems are complex and much of this important data is stored across the
globe,131 law enforcement must frequently obtain digital evidence that is physically stored in a foreign state. The already overburdened MLAT process was
not equipped to handle collection of data for criminal investigations; a tenmonth delay in the investigation, caused by relying on MLATs, cannot yield
effective law enforcement.132
The CLOUD Act’s extraterritorial application of SCA warrants improved
accessibility and solved the time delay problem involved with criminal investigations on a domestic level. It relieved the strain placed on the overburdened
MLAT system and made clear that U.S. law will apply in evidence collection
where a U.S. technology company has custody of the digital data.
The concerns raised by privacy advocates are not as potent when evaluating domestic investigations. United States law, and its robust privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment, still apply to extraterritorial SCA warrants.133 The full process must be satisfied, including showing a finding of
probable cause.134 Even though the United States would not be required to
follow the exact law of the foreign state where the evidence was physically
stored, it still would safeguard against abuses through its own privacy protections. There is little fear that applying SCA warrants extraterritorially will lead
to domestic privacy abuses within the boundaries of the United States. In fact,
the ACLU and other human rights organizations aim their privacy criticisms
solely at the executive agreements provision of the CLOUD Act, not its application to SCA warrants.135
It makes logical sense that U.S. law would apply in digital evidence collection for an alleged crime against the United States, where a U.S. company
has control over the evidence—regardless of the data storage facility’s
130
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geographic location. The United States government, most major U.S. technology companies, and many legal academics all agree that SCA warrants applying to data physically stored outside of the United States is a positive, necessary step aligned with the needs of modern technology.136
Conversely, there is room to improve the second function of the CLOUD
Act: its executive agreements provision. The idea to create a means for foreign
states to enter mutual agreements that allow for easier data sharing across borders is a positive change; however, the CLOUD Act misses the mark on various functional points.
The Act was a rushed piece of legislation, buried as part of a larger spending bill and passed without thorough vetting or consideration on international
impact.137 This is the reason for the overall negative response from foreign
governments and international human rights groups regarding these new executive agreements.138 There also exists domestic distrust regarding these executive agreements.139 However, with a few key changes suggested below, the
data sharing agreements could be improved without hindering their functionality.
A. Mandatory Annual Compliance Review
Human rights protections are an important consideration when discussing
cross-border data sharing agreements because increased data accessibility
could potentially infringe on the right to privacy.140 Therefore, only foreign
states with adequate human rights protections and privacy protections should
be permitted to participate in these agreements. The CLOUD Act recognized
the need for stringent protections; thus, the Act imposed a lengthy set of human rights prerequisites on foreign states looking to enter an executive agreement.141 Both the U.S. Attorney General and Secretary of State certify in writing with an accompanying explanation that the foreign state has adequate
privacy and civil liberties protections before an executive agreement may exist with that foreign state.142
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However, the U.S. government’s evaluation of a foreign state’s human
rights compliance is insufficient. Evaluation of privacy and civil liberties protections occurs prior to entering the agreement, with follow-up compliance
reviews in subsequent five-year intervals.143 This process effectively whitelists foreign states as human rights compliant for an extended period; it allows
continued access to data, even in situations where a state experiences rapid
decline in its human rights protections.144 To combat this problem, mandatory
reviews of the foreign state’s privacy and human rights protections should
occur once every year.
Following an attempted coup in 2016, Turkey declared an ongoing state of
emergency and waged war on all government criticism.145 The Turkish government imprisoned hundreds of journalists and media workers, raided offices
of human rights organizations, disrupted peaceful protests, and tortured activists in police custody.146 This drastic decay of human rights protections occurred within one year.147 If Turkey had an executive data sharing agreement
with the United States prior to these events, the current compliance review
scheme under the CLOUD Act would be insufficient to diagnose and prevent
abuses in data collection. Events in Turkey illustrate that a five year window
between compliance reviews will not safeguard against a foreign state that
bottoms out its human rights protections within those five years.
More frequent compliance reviews are necessary to prevent abuse. While
it is true that increased resources would be required to administer more frequent compliance reviews, the additional protection would be worth any marginal inconvenience. Further, there are methods that could help facilitate administrability; for example, the process could include an incentive program
that makes the burden of showing compliance lighter for foreign states with a
demonstrated history of high protections on privacy and human rights.148 Annual compliance reviews under this proposed system would keep a closer
watch for data collection abuses, while still maintaining an efficient level of
administrability. Further, the level of administrability would still be far superior than its predecessor, the MLAT system.149
Annual compliance reviews would have the further benefit of collecting
more results on compliance trends, which would give the U.S. government an
143
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opportunity to identify overall problem areas and evaluate whether the regulations baked into the CLOUD Act had the desired effect on foreign states.150
In addition, the main contention international human rights groups, such
as the ACLU and Amnesty International, have with the CLOUD Act is its
relatively infrequent compliance reviews of human rights protections.151
Changing to an annual compliance review model would help appease these
groups and may even garner their support for changes made under the
CLOUD Act, which could improve foreign reaction to the executive agreements and encourage adoption.
B. Congressional Approval of Executive Agreements
As its name suggests, executive agreements under the CLOUD Act are
almost entirely within the purview of the executive branch. The judiciary is
taken out of this process through statutory language that expressly eliminates
judicial review.152 Similarly, the legislature’s role is severely limited. Congress has 180 days from notice of the agreement to pass a joint resolution of
disapproval in both the House of Representatives and the Senate;153 otherwise,
Congress has no recourse to challenge these executive data-sharing agreements. The CLOUD Act is an example that highlights the common phenomenon of international agreements made by the executive branch acting alone,
which also raises questions about separation of powers and equitable international lawmaking.154 A better approach is to require congressional approval of
each individual data sharing agreement, while creating a “fast track” system
that would streamline the process. Congressional supervision would create a
more balanced, democratic, and effective approach without sacrificing much
efficiency.
There is no problem with the CLOUD Act expressly eliminating judicial
review. In accordance with the political question doctrine, the judicial branch
defers on issues related to international agreements approved by Congress.155
As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, “the choice of what procedure to use for a given agreement is committed to the discretion and expertise of the Legislative and
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Executive Branches by virtue of the political question doctrine.”156 Therefore,
statutory language eliminating judicial review in the context of cross-border
data sharing executive agreements is proper; it puts an articulable point on a
concept already followed by the courts.
Congressional involvement in executive agreements, however, is necessary to ensure democratic accountability. Unfortunately, congressional involvement is typically limited in the context of international agreements. The
legislature’s role in conducting international agreements was evaporated postWorld War II by a systematic yielding of power to the President.157 Congress
passed a wide variety of statutes, many of which were vague and open-ended,
that allowed the President to put executive agreements into force without further legislative involvement.158
Agreements enacted by the executive branch under advanced authority
granted by Congress are often called “ex ante” congressional-executive agreements, and they account for approximately eighty percent of all U.S. international legal commitments.159 Executive agreements under the CLOUD Act are
examples of ex ante congressional-executive agreements.
Utilizing ex ante congressional-executive agreements presents a problem
because it centralizes international lawmaking ability within the executive
branch.160 Congress has very little power regarding these agreements.161 In
theory, Congress has the power to adjust ex ante congressional-executive
agreements through passing subsequent legislation; however, this is rarely
achieved in reality because any effort to revoke or limit executive power can
be vetoed by the President.162
Some argue that this change is a good thing, that international agreements
are best left to the sole discretion of the executive branch. They contend that
separation of powers concerns are not as strong when the consequences
mostly affect institutions outside the United States.163 Further, they assert that
sole executive power might have the added benefits of ensuring consistent
leadership in foreign relations while giving the President stronger negotiating
power.164
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These arguments are misguided. Even though executive agreements deal
with institutions and actors beyond U.S. borders, unilateral international lawmaking by the executive branch produces significant domestic impact.165 The
United States is held to follow the rules of foreign interaction prescribed by
the President—he or she alone dictates how the rest of the country must act
regarding many matters such as foreign commerce and diplomacy.166
Additionally, placing all international lawmaking power on the President
does not lead to more effective lawmaking. Creating effective international
law requires adequate political support to ensure that international commitments created under the agreements are actually performed.167 While agreements negotiated by the president acting alone may be easier to create, those
agreements are less likely to be followed. For example, a subsequent presidential administration might withdraw from or fail to observe an agreement
made by a previous president acting on their own. That same subsequent administration would be much more cautious about failing to honor an agreement that was passed with consent of Congress.168
Placing the power to conduct international lawmaking in a single branch
of government also violates separation of powers. Government power must
be divided into separated institutions; the system is designed to prevent the
distinct branches of government from controlling the functions of other
branches.169 Ex ante congressional-executive agreements, such as agreements
under the CLOUD Act, completely destroy this purpose by giving the executive branch the ability to create international law. The President is given the
ability to “write” international laws by exercising sole discretion over which
foreign states will have an executive data sharing agreement with the United
States. Creating laws is a power of the legislative branch of the U.S. government. Even though the President is, in effect, creating international law, the
executive branch remains immune from democratic accountability. There is
potential risk that a President could use executive agreements as political
tools, even if those agreements are contrary to democratic interests.
The risk of politicizing executive agreements is especially dangerous in
the context of data sharing. As discussed previously, the CLOUD Act authorizes agreements that are integral to aiding modern law enforcement; presidents may use these highly desirable agreements as bargaining chips to advance political agendas. However, these agreements are also volatile because
of the sensitivity of information and risk that governments could use that
165
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information to abuse human rights; this is the reason each agreement is scrutinized through robust human rights protections. Nonetheless, it is easy to imagine situations where a president might bend the rules on enforcing human
rights protections in order to push through an executive data sharing agreement that would result in political gain.
If this type of misbehavior occurred, Congress would be powerless to stop
it. The only recourse available to Congress (or any other entity) would be to
pass subsequent legislation, which the President could veto. Abuses in creating cross-border data sharing agreements are egregious because they result in
threats against the privacy and safety of people across the globe. It is imperative for the United States to take all reasonable measures in order to protect
against those abuses, including congressional approval of each agreement as
a check on executive power.
Congressional approval of the individual agreements would add a step to
the process, but it would not result in a substantial loss of efficiency if a “fast
track” procedure was adopted. This type of expedited approval is sometimes
used in the context of trade agreements.170
The fast track procedure required the leaders of the House and Senate to
introduce trade agreements proposed by the President on the same day the
agreement was submitted or on the next day possible if a house was not in
session.171 The agreement could not be amended,172 debate on the agreement
was limited to “not more than 20 hours” in each house,173 filibusters were not
permitted in the Senate,174 and the agreement would pass by a simple majority
vote in each house.175 These votes were required to take place “on or before
the close of the 15th day” after the implementing bill or approval resolution
was reported out of committee.176
A similar procedural framework could speed up the congressional approval process of executive data sharing agreements. Though fast track has
170
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never been used outside the scope of trade agreements, legal academic Oona
Hathaway argues that a fast track process could apply to “approval of international agreements in any area of international law.”177 Therefore, this process
could be adopted on a narrow basis to facilitate congressional approval of
cross-border data sharing executive agreements under the CLOUD Act and
any other agreement that involves sharing of sensitive personal data. Narrowing the scope of the fast track process would limit inefficiency by not burdening Congress with approval of every executive agreement.
While the features of a fast track process (such as limited debate and prohibition of amendments) may seem disadvantageous to Congress, fast track
would still provide Congress with an important check on executive power. It
would do so in a way that is easy to administer and would not sacrifice efficiency, while also protecting against abuses in creating these potentially dangerous data sharing agreements.
The risk of politicizing executive data sharing agreements requires implementation of a congressional approval system. A fast track procedure, similar
to what has been previously utilized in trade agreements, is the most efficient
way to do so. Adding this protection might not have a huge impact on affecting foreign perception of the changes made under the CLOUD Act; however,
a congressional approval protection is an important measure to ensure separation of powers and equitable international lawmaking. Both of those concepts
have the potential to cause a major impact on both a domestic and international scale.
C. Eliminate Reciprocal Data Sharing Requirement for Executive
Agreements
Included in the CLOUD Act’s executive agreement provision is a reciprocal data sharing requirement.178 In order to enter an executive agreement, the
foreign state must grant the U.S. reciprocal access to data held by the foreign
state.179 This requirement presents a problem because compliance with reciprocal data sharing could be contrary to local laws of the foreign state.180 The
EU’s recently passed GDPR makes it unlawful to transfer data unless certain
conditions are met.181 With mandated reciprocal data sharing, situations could
arise where an EU member state would be forced to compel a local service
177
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provider to turn over data to the United States when that transfer would otherwise be unlawful under the GDPR.
Article 48 of the GDPR does carve out an exception that allows transfers
made pursuant to an international agreement, such as an MLAT.182 But it is
not yet known whether executive agreements under the CLOUD Act will satisfy Article 48.183 Because the executive agreements would offer fewer privacy protections on an individual level, GDPR protection authorities could
determine the CLOUD Act agreements are inconsistent with the protections
contemplated by Article 48.184
China enacted the Cyber Security Law (CSL) in 2017,185 which is a robust
piece of legislation intended to prevent cyberattacks and protect data privacy.
Article 37 of the CSL requires personal and other important information to be
physically stored on servers in China; it also prevents transferring that data
abroad without prior approval and a security assessment from Chinese regulators.186 This is another example of a conflict between the CLOUD Act and
local laws of a foreign state. Even though a CLOUD Act executive agreement
would require China to reciprocally share their data with the United States,
the CSL would prohibit them from doing so.
Forced reciprocity among data-sharing agreements may contribute to the
unease many foreign states have for these agreements. The majority of the
world’s digital data is held by U.S. technology companies,187 so the United
States has a bargaining chip to entice foreign states into an executive datasharing agreement. However, to get easier access to this wealth of U.S. held
data, the foreign state must also make data held by its entities available to the
U.S. The EU, China, and other countries that have recently increased data
protections might see this as invasive. These countries, and many others, are
avoiding measures that liberalize cross-border data accessibility (such as the
CLOUD Act executive agreements) and instead are restricting data flow
through laws that block cross-border transfers and mandate data localization.188
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Restricting data accessibility fractures the digital world and leads to undesirable outcomes. When all data is forcibly stored in one state, there is increased risk of privacy abuses from the government of that state or other entities.189 Restricted data accessibility also restricts international trade190 and
increases data storage costs.191 The United States must do everything it can to
ensure effective accessibility of data across borders, which includes encouraging adoption of as many data sharing agreements as possible.
Some may have a gut reaction that it is “unfair” to provide foreign states
with easier access to U.S.-held data without receiving reciprocal access, but
reciprocal data sharing does not have much value to the U.S. because most
digital data is already held by U.S. technology companies,192 and the CLOUD
Act gives the United States easy access to that data, regardless of where it is
physically stored, through SCA warrants.193 In the rare instances where the
United States needs access to data held by a foreign company in a foreign
state, the United States can still rely on MLATs to retrieve the data.194
More positive outcomes for the U.S. would be achieved through eliminating the reciprocal data sharing requirement of CLOUD Act executive agreements. If foreign states did not have the pressure of reciprocal data sharing,
they would be further incentivized to join in these agreements; there would be
no reason for any qualified country not to have an agreement with the U.S.
Entering into agreements with as many foreign states as possible is in the
best interests of the United States because it would improve foreign perception
of the CLOUD Act, encourage adoption of these executive agreements, discourage mandated data localization laws, and thus encourage foreign states
(and the people in foreign states) to use U.S. technology companies. This
would ultimately give the United States better accessibility to more data than
would be achieved by reciprocation under the executive agreements.
D. Notice Requirement
The right to notice when a search warrant is executed and personal property is seized is a common principle of U.S. law.195 A notice requirement is
important because it affords the owner of the property due process and allows
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him or her to manage or retrieve the seized property.196 It follows that the
same principle would apply when an SCA warrant is executed and personal
data is seized. While there may be an argument that the notice requirement
under U.S. law would apply to domestic search warrants, the executive agreement provision does not have a notice requirement.197 The CLOUD Act does
not require notice to be provided to a foreign person whose data is targeted
and seized via an executive data sharing agreement.198
A requirement of notice when personal property is taken (including personal data) is a phenomenon adopted by many countries around the world. In
fact, over 100 countries have data protection laws, and many of those laws
include a right to notice.199
The EU and its member states are particularly concerned with data privacy
and providing citizens autonomy over their personal data.200 In addition to
severely limited circumstances imposed by the GDPR that restrict when personal data can be collected and transferred across international borders,201 the
GDPR also expands the type of notice data owners must receive when their
data is transferred.202
Asian, Latin American, and African countries also have their own notice
requirements and data protection obligations.203 These laws tend to have some
commonality, inclusive of a notice requirement.204 Generally speaking, notice
requirements in these nations typically consist of notifying the data owner of
“what personal information is collected, why it is collected, and with whom it
is shared.”205
Notice is an important concept to many foreign states in the context of
collecting and sharing personal data. Because of this, the CLOUD Act executive agreements provision should be amended to include a notice requirement.
When personal data is transferred via an executive data-sharing agreement,
the owner of that data should be notified of the process. At minimum, notice
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of what personal data was accessed and that the government has the data
should be required when a request under a data-sharing agreement is fulfilled.
Adopting this type of notice requirement would stay in line with the data
protection schemes that many countries have across the globe.206 It would reduce potential conflicts of laws by ensuring data transfers under executive
agreements were held to the same or similar data protection restrictions of the
particular jurisdiction.
Adding a notice requirement would also make executive data sharing
agreements under the CLOUD Act more appealing to foreign states and the
people of those nations. Because the constituents of a foreign state are better
protected and informed through a notice requirement, adding this measure will
likely lead to greater local support among a foreign state. A notice requirement
would also reduce complexity by remedying potential conflicts of laws, provide clearer expectations, and help demonstrate government transparency
within a foreign state.
All of these benefits suggest that a notice requirement would incentivize
adoption of executive data-sharing agreements. As discussed in Section V,
Subsection C of this Note, the interests of the U.S., and the international community at large will be best served by encouraging the adoption of international agreements and eliminating the need for alternative, harmful measures
such as mandated data localization.
VII. CONCLUSION
The CLOUD Act was a necessary piece of legislation that solved data access problems faced by modern law enforcement. Due to changes in technology, the prior version of the SCA was insufficient, and changes affected by
the CLOUD Act needed to be made. Cloud storage and complex data management systems necessitate extraterritorial application of SCA warrants.
It is unreasonable to require law enforcement to rely on cumbersome, timeconsuming MLATs when conducting criminal investigations. A ten-month
delay on received data via MLAT is detrimental to criminal investigations;
modern law enforcement could not operate effectively under that system. Extraterritorial SCA warrants solve the time delay problem by streamlining the
process, while keeping in line with the intentions of the SCA.
The executive data-sharing agreements allowed by the CLOUD Act also
have potential to be meaningful tools in the modern world. They can facilitate
data-sharing across borders and ensure that the internet continues to be one
open, free-flowing entity. Productive results such as these are the reason many
people and entities in the U.S. support the CLOUD Act.
Without data-sharing agreements of this kind, foreign states turn to other,
more harmful methods to regulate data. Measures such as mandated data
206
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localization “balkanize” the internet and lead to host of other issues including
negative impact on international trade, increased data storage costs, and
greater susceptibility to destruction of data by natural disasters. It is imperative that the U.S. uses all means available to improve these executive agreements and encourage their adoption. Utilizing responsible cross-border data
sharing agreements is a better way to ensure proper management of data on
an international level, compared to the potentially harmful alternatives.
Though the Act was met by mostly positive reaction from domestic institutions, there were some domestic entities that criticized the Act as offering a
means for foreign states to abuse civil liberties while offering inadequate protections on human rights. The domestic criticisms of the CLOUD Act pertain
to the executive agreements provision. Therefore, improving executive agreements to better protect privacy and civil liberties of foreign persons would
have the added benefit of improving domestic perception and support for the
Act.
Overall foreign response to the CLOUD Act was not positive; many foreign states were uneasy about the Act, seeing it as an extension of United
States power into the international sphere. These concerns could be alleviated
through improvements to the executive agreements provision of the Act.
The CLOUD Act is a good start, but it’s an imperfect document. Several
key amendments to the Act could improve upon it and help alleviate the concern expressed domestically and abroad. Mandatory annual compliance reviews would improve the CLOUD Act because they would ensure that only
foreign states who maintained human rights and privacy protections could access sensitive data.
A compliance review of these protections conducted every year would defend against a country that experiences a rapid decline in human rights; more
frequent compliance reviews would prevent “whitelisting” foreign states as
human rights compliant for extended periods of time.
Congressional approval of each individual agreement is another change
that would improve the CLOUD Act’s executive agreements provision. Centralizing the ability to enter the agreements solely within the purview of the
executive branch violates separation of powers and is not an effective means
of international lawmaking. Due to the sensitivity of information distributed
under these agreements and its desirable nature, a risk exists that the executive
branch could abuse the agreements for political gain. Congress must be involved in order to inject democratic accountability into the process while
providing a check on presidential power. Congress could achieve this purpose
without sacrificing efficiency by adopting a “fast track” method to approve
the agreements.
The CLOUD Act would also be improved by removing the reciprocal datasharing requirement. For the reasons stated previously, it is important for the
U.S. to encourage foreign states to adopt executive data sharing agreements.
Fear over U.S. access to data is a main factor in the overall foreign unease
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surrounding the CLOUD Act; that fear will be a barrier to encouraging adoption of these agreements. The U.S. will not get much benefit from reciprocal
data-sharing because most of the world’s data is already held by U.S. companies, and thus accessible to the United States via SCA warrants.
The U.S. would receive more benefit from the increased adoption of executive data-sharing agreements than the reciprocal requirement, which is hindering the agreements’ adoption. Without a reciprocal data-sharing requirement, foreign states previously focused on data localization may even be
incentivized to allow use of U.S. technology company services—which would
lead to more people in those countries using U.S. technology services and in
turn would give the U.S. greater access to that data in the long run.
Finally, a notice requirement should be added that would require the owner
of any personal data to be notified when a transfer via executive agreement is
fulfilled. This measure would reduce conflict of laws issues, improve local
approval of data-sharing agreements, and foster government transparency in
the foreign state.
These changes would lead to increased positive reaction to the Act, better
foreign relations, and more robust international human rights protections.
They would also encourage maintaining an open internet and disincentivize
laws in foreign states that mandate data localization.
The CLOUD Act is already a domestic success. Most people within U.S.
borders support it and the changes it represents. Although foreign reaction is
not as favorable, minor changes in the CLOUD Act could go a long way in
bettering its international impact. The amendments expressed in this Note will
help improve domestic impression, while also bettering the Act’s international
impact and its role in U.S. foreign relations. Nevertheless, the CLOUD Act is
an important piece of legislation in the modern era of digital data proliferation,
and it will affect meaningful change on a global scale.

